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PAYING FOR ENERGY PEAKS: LEARNING FROM TEXAS'
FEBRUARY 2021 POWER CRISIS
Colleen M. Baker and James W. Coleman1
1.

INTRODUCTION

From February 14–19, 2021, winter storm Uri blanketed Texas
with extreme cold. Tragically, the severe temperatures overwhelmed the
state’s power system. Texas’ power grid ended up more than 20 Gigawatts
short of the electricity Texans needed 2 – more power than all of California
produces on an average day. Over two-hundred lives were lost3 and an
estimated $295 billion in damage resulted.4 Yet many had long regarded
Texas’ electric power system, and its regulation, as a model for
others. What happened? That question is the focus of this article.
This article first provides an overview of the severe power outages
in February 2021 and the regulation of Texas’ electric power system,
explaining why Texas is on the forefront of challenges that will grow more
prominent as the world transitions to cleaner energy. Next, it discusses
competing electric power business models and their regulation, including
why many had long viewed Texas as a model of wise electricity regulation,
and why the problems revealed by winter storm Uri will only grow more
pressing for not just Texas but the entire world as it transitions to more
reliance on electricity and a power grid supported by natural gas and
renewables. It concludes by discussing Texas’ path forward and the
broader lessons of this crisis for business lawyers and others. The
tremendous economic losses of this episode attest to the importance of
business lawyers having a basic understanding of their clients’ energy
dependencies, the risks that significant power problems could present to

Colleen M. Baker is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in the Price College of
Business and Affiliate Faculty at the Law School at the University of Oklahoma. James
W. Coleman is a Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University. Professor Coleman
discussed some material in this article during his September 7, 2021, appearance on the
podcast, Emphasis Added: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNTNpxvFBJs&t=209s.
2 Keith Everhart & Gergely Molnar, Severe power cuts in Texas highlight energy security risks
related to extreme weather events, INT’L ENERGY ADMIN. (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/severe-power-cuts-in-texas-highlight-energysecurity-risks-related-to-extreme-weather-events; February 2021 Cold Weather Grid
Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full Presentation, FED. ENERGY REGUL.
COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2021), https://ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-gridoperations-preliminary-findings-and-recommendations-full.
3 Winter Storm Related Deaths, TEX. DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH SERV. (July 13, 2021),
https://www.dshs.state.tx.us/news/updates.shtm#wn.
4 Chris Stipes, New Report Details Impact of Winter Storm Uri on Texas, UNIV. HOUSTON
(March 29, 2021), https://uh.edu/news-events/stories/2021/march-2021/03292021hobby-winter-storm.php.
1
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their businesses, and the ability to advise them as they seek to mitigate
such vulnerabilities.
2. THE FEBRUARY 2021 SNOWPOCALYPSE AND TEXAS’ POWER GRID
The “snowpocalypse” or “snowmageddon” of February 2021,5
brought several days of subfreezing temperatures to Texas, a state with the
unusual situation of having its own power grid.6 The severe, but not
unprecedented,7 winter storm – “all 254 counties of Texas [were] under a
winter storm warning at the same time”8 – wreaked havoc on the power
grid. Widespread outages followed due to a combination of demand
surges and supply failures.9 During this time, approximately four million
homes lost power and many remained in the dark for several days.10 In
addition to the power problems, pipes burst, water in toilets froze, and
water treatment facilities failed, forcing residents to boil water before
consuming it.11
The power grid must continuously balance the amount of power
demanded by every consumer on the grid – exactly matching the amount
of power demanded every time you plug in or unplug your phone or turn
the heat up or down.12 The grid relies upon several sources of energy:

Winter storm Uri was one of the costliest natural disasters in Texas history. See Mitchell
Ferman, Winter storm could cost Texas more money than any disaster in state history, THE TEX.
TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texas-winter-stormcost-budget/.
6 Alaska and Hawaii also have their own power grids. Additionally, countries smaller
than Texas - for example Spain and France - generally have their own power grids.
7 The lowest temperature in February 2021 for Dallas was 4 degrees Fahrenheit, but
temperatures reached 1 and 2 degrees Fahrenheit in 1905 and 1933, respectively. See
DFW– Temperature Extremes, NAT’L. WEATHER SERV. (Nov. 17, 2021),
https://www.weather.gov/fwd/dgr8mxmn.
8 Andrea Zelinski, What Went Wrong With Texas’s Main Electric Grid and Could It Have Been
Prevented?, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.texasmonthly.com/newspolitics/what-went-wrong-with-texass-main-electric-grid-and-could-it-have-beenprevented. (quoting Dr. Joshua D. Rhodes, a postdoctoral researcher at Webber Energy
Group).
9 Peter Cramton, Fostering Resiliency With Good Market Design: Lessons From Texas (May 17,
2021),
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-lessons-from-the2021-texas-electricity-crisis.pdf.
10 See Zelinski, supra note 8.
11 Reese Oxner, Texans now face a water crisis after enduring days without power, THE TEX, TRIB.
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/19/texas-water-poweroutages/.
12 James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OH.
STATE L.J. 263, 270 (2019).
5
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wind, solar, hydro, natural gas, coal, nuclear, and others.13 Naturally, it is
easiest to balance the grid if these power sources can be directed to
dispatch power when needed. But over time, the grid is using less power
from dispatchable sources, such as coal power, and more from nondispatchable sources such as solar and wind – sources that only provide
the limited power that the sun or wind allows in a given moment.14 Texas
is number one among the states for the use of wind energy in electricity
production.15 Consumers demand most power in the early evening
hours,16 but generally solar power is strongest at midday17 and wind power
tends to be strongest in the early morning hours.18 So power grid managers
have to make sure there is enough dispatchable power to meet peak
demand, and in recent years natural gas power plants have been the
overwhelming choice for new dispatchable power plants.19
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) operates
Texas’ power grid and is overseen by the Public Utility Commission of
Texas (PUCT) and the Texas Legislature.20 ERCOT’s four main
responsibilities are to: 1) “[m]aintain system reliability,” 2) “[f]acilitate a
competitive wholesale market,” 3) “[f]acilitate a competitive retail market,”
and 4) “[e]nsure open access to transmission.”21 ERCOT produces
seasonal forecasts of power demand.22 Unfortunately, its peak demand
Update to April 6, 2021 Preliminary Report on Causes of Generator Outages and Derates During
the February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event, ERCOT (April 27, 2021) [hereinafter
ERCOT Update].
14 Renewables became the second-most prevalent U.S. electricity source in 2020, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN (July 8, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48896.
15
Texas: Profile Analysis, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 17, 2021)
https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=TX.
16 See Hourly Electricity Consumption Varies Throughout The Day and Across Seasons, U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Feb.
21,
2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42915.
17 Solar Explained, Where Solar Is Found and Used, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 26,
2021) https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/solar/where-solar-is-found.php.
18 The Central United States Set Several Wind Power Records This Spring, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (June 12, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44075.
19 See generally New U.S. Power Plants Expected to be Mostly Natural Gas Combined-Cycle and
Solar
PV,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38612 (showing new electric power
capacity has predominantly come from natural gas, solar, and wind power, with no more
coal and very little nuclear expected in the future).
20
Fact
Sheet,
ERCOT
(Feb.
2021),
http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/219736/ERCOT_Fact_Sheet_2.12.21.pdf.
21 Id.
22 E.g., Final Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy for the ERCOT Region (SARA) Winter
2020/2021,
ERCOT
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2020/11/05/SARA-FinalWinter2020-2021.pdf
(outlining expected demand for winter 2020-2021).
13
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forecast for winter 2020–21 proved woefully inadequate.23 In managing
the grid, ERCOT collects information from power operators about how
much power they are willing to supply and at what price and matches this
information with system demand, to determine market prices.24
During the storm, ERCOT asked utilities to shut off power for
millions to prevent the grid from failing completely.25 The shortage
reached “as high as 20 GWs and averaged about 10 GWs or 20 percent of
demand.”26 By the night of February 15, in an attempt to balance grid
supply and demand, ERCOT was ordering an amount of load shedding
greater than the amount of power California generates for all its
residents.27 In just the first two days of blackouts, Texas shed roughly
more than 500 times what California shed during its summer 2020 rolling
blackouts.28 Eventually, the grid did not have even enough power to
sustain both rolling blackouts and the provision of power to critical
infrastructure.29 Hence, millions of Texans had no power for days.30
Indeed, “ERCOT averaged [having] 34,000 MW [(34GWs)] of generation
unavailable (based on expected capacity) for two consecutive days from
February 15 to 17, equivalent to nearly half of its all-time winter peak
electric load of 69,871 MW.”31

23See

generally Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy for the ERCOT Region (SARA) Winter
2021/2022,
ERCOT
(Nov.
19,
2021),
https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/11/19/SARA_Winter2021-22.pdf (reporting
a “new aggressive approach” to electric grid management and including “additional lowprobability, high-impact scenarios”).
24 See Market Prices, ERCOT, https://www.ercot.com/mktinfo/prices (last visited Feb. 1,
2022).
25 Zelinski, supra note 8.
26 Cramton, supra note 9, at 2.
27 Compare Everhart & Molnar, supra note 2 (showing shed of 27 GW giga watt of load
on the night of February 15), with State Electricity Profiles, Data for 2020, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/ (showing that in
2020, California generated 193,074 MWh of electricity, which is 22 GW on average).
28 Everhart & Molnar, supra note 2; see Ivan Penn, California Expresses Frustration as
Blackouts
Enter
4th
Day,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/17/business/energy-environment/californiablackout-electricgrid.html#:~:text=The%20agency%20that%20manages%20the,said%20regulators%20
were%20not%20prepared (Aug. 19, 2020), for more on California’s summer rolling
blackouts.
29 Crampton, supra note 9, at 7–9.
30 Id. at 7.
31 February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation, et. al, supra note 2, at 7.
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WHAT WENT WRONG?

A number of problems contributed in varying degrees to the
power outages, such as: weather related issues, existing plant outages, fuel
limitations, equipment problems, transmission line losses, grid frequency
related issues32 However, weather complications (freezing issues33) were
the most significant factor.34 The second most important factor was
natural gas supply chain issues, which included both declines in production
and plant power losses.35 These multiple weather and supply chain
challenges led to a rapid decrease in power generation as demand surged.
In turn, this caused a precipitous drop in the grid’s frequency, which
dipped below the minimum requirement of 59.302 Hz36 for several
minutes and, catastrophically, brought the grid to within minutes of
collapse.37
The grid’s imbalance of supply and demand had two primary
causes. The first cause was ERCOT’s seasonal forecast, which
significantly underestimated the power demand likely to occur in extreme,
but possible weather conditions.38 The second was that the grid’s
vulnerabilities caused cascading power outages.39 Wind turbines froze and
snow covered solar panels. The severe cold increased the difficulty of
pumping natural gas, which shrinks in cold temperatures, out of the
ground. Additionally: Texas and the south-central U.S. rely heavily on
natural gas for fueling electric generation to meet peak capacity and energy
needs.40 Likewise, the natural gas infrastructure relies heavily on electrical
power for producing, processing and transporting natural gas to end-users,
ERCOT Update, supra note 13, at 4.
February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining problems caused by the failure to “winterize”
the relevant infrastructure).
34 ERCOT Update, supra note 13 , at 4.
35 February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation, supra note 2, at 12–14.
36 Excessive demand for electricity lowers the frequency level and excessive supply
increases it. To maintain the grid’s integrity, a tight balancing of supply and demand at
all times is necessary to keep the frequency of the grid within a tightly defined range.
37 Erin Douglas, Texas was “seconds and minutes” away from catastrophic monthslong blackouts,
officials
say,
THE
TEX.
TRIB.,
(Feb.
18.
2021),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/18/texas-power-outages-ercot/.
38 The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts, UNIV. OF TEX.
AT
AUSTIN,
ENERGY
INST.,
Jul.
2021,
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustin_(2021)_EventsFebru
ary2021TexasBlackout_(002)FINAL_07_12_21.pdf.
39 Id. at 56.
40 February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation, supra note 2 at 5–6.
32
33
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including natural-gas fired generation and residential heating customers.
Careful planning and coordination to manage the needs of the natural gas
and electric systems in light of this “interdependency” is important so that
both systems are ultimately reliable for consumers, especially during cold
weather conditions when the demand for natural gas and electricity are at
their highest levels.41 Hence, a portion of Texas’ natural gas production,
including plants, pipelines, and field pumps, relies upon electricity. The
power outages disrupted such interdependent supply chains.
A variety of failures contributed to the loss of power by critical
energy infrastructure. For example, in many cases, critical infrastructure
failed to file a one-page form to advise ERCOT of its status as such.42 In
fact, “most of the natural gas production and processing facilities
surveyed…were not identified as critical loads or otherwise protected
from manual load shedding.”43 As a result, ERCOT’s manual load
shedding actually contributed to the decrease in natural gas production.44
In other cases, parts of the natural gas supply chain had signed up for
ERCOT’s Demand Response Program, which is designed to decrease
participants’ power costs overall, but meant they could not perform when
natural gas was most needed.45 Additionally, as discussed in Part III, there
were vulnerabilities in the grid’s scarcity pricing mechanism.
Texas’ power grid is particularly at risk from extreme cold
temperatures for three reasons.
First, its design centers on
accommodation of peak demand from high summer temperatures.46
Second, homes in Texas are generally constructed to expel heat and to
keep it out.47 Third, some homes use electricity (about 60%) and others
natural gas (about 40%) for heating and this creates competition for
natural gas in the winter. 48 Consequently, both power plants and homes
were increasing their demand for natural gas as storm-related disruptions
occurred in the natural gas supply chain, drastically reducing natural gas
delivery to Texas consumers.49
Id.
Niki Roberts & David H. Sweeny, Critical Load Designation Critical for Nat Gas Producers,
AKIN
GUMP:
AG
SPEAKING
ENERGY
(Mar.
29,
2021),
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/industries/energy/speakingenergy/critical-load-designation-critical-for-nat-gas-producers.html.
43 February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation , supra note 2, at 15.
44 February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations- Full
Presentation, supra note 2, at 15.
45 See The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts, supra note 38.
46 Zelinski, supra note 8.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
41
42
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ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN TEXAS

As “almost an electricity island”,50 Texas power grid avoids
regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This
arrangement permits Texas to have its own energy policy and, arguably,
facilitates a high level of innovation and flexibility to address energy
challenges. As noted, Texas produces more wind power than any other
state,51 and it has been ramping up its solar power capacity. State
regulation of the grid has facilitated the financing necessary for
transitioning to cleaner energy sources because it has enabled broad-based
cost sharing among Texas consumers rather than having to allocate all
costs to actual users.52
However, Texas’ energy insularity also means that in supply
shortages, Texas cannot rely upon other power systems for much help.53
Without significant interstate grid connections,54 recovery from a full grid
blackout would also take much longer,55 significantly increasing costs to
citizens and businesses.56 One commentator paints a dire picture of this
full blackout scenario:
[It] would be a delicate and lengthy process that would
have to start from zero. It would take many weeks to
execute. During that period, aside from what first
responders could truck in or airlift from neighboring
states, there would be no electricity, no heat, no water, no
gasoline, and no standard communications.57
Around the world, electricity markets are often managed by
traditional, regulated utility monopolies where the government sets power
Cramton, supra note 9, at 24.
Texas State Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last visited Nov. 27, 2021),
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=TX.
52 R. Ryan Staine, CREZ II, Coming Soon to a Windy Texas Plain Near You: Encouraging the
Texas Renewable Energy Industry through Transmission Investment, 93 TEX. L. REV. 521, 525–32
(2014).
53 Cramton, supra note 9, at 25.
54
See generally Learn More About Interconnections, OFF. OF ELEC.,
https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-andimplementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited Oct. 26,
2021)(explaining, for example, a minimal ERCOT Interconnection exists with the
Eastern Interconnection and Mexico and can import up to 1,220 MW).
55 Cramton, supra note 9, at 1.
56 Id.
57 Cramton, supra note 9, at 9.

50
51
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rates. Jurisdictions that instead use competition tend to rely upon two
types of markets: a long-term “capacity market” that pays power plants to
be available to provide power and a short-term “energy market” that pays
companies to dispatch power to the grid.58 Regardless of the approach,
“[e]lectricity, unlike other products, requires that supply and demand
balance every second so that frequency and voltage stay within tight
tolerances. Absent this balance, generating units will trip off, causing a
catastrophic blackout.”59 Texas’ grid must maintain this tight equilibrium
for a growing population of almost 30 million.60 Adding to the challenge,
electricity is also expensive and difficult to store61 as is natural gas.
In capacity markets, power plants are paid for providing capacity
even if energy is not ultimately produced.62 Capacity markets employ
different types of capacity mechanisms (such as obligations or
requirements) to set minimum demand levels or use futures markets to
ensure demand is reliably met.63 These capacity approaches aim to ensure
generators have liquidity, an incentive to make power investments, and
attempt to lower generators’ upfront investment risk.64
Texas, by contrast, uses the second type of market, an “energyonly” approach, which only compensates generators when they actually
dispatch power to the grid. This approach has to wrestle with a “missingmoney problem,” which requires mechanisms to incentivize operators to
make costly, upfront power investments when the financial payoffs of
these investments depend upon an uncertain future.65 These “energyonly” markets use scarcity pricing, the practice of increasing prices as
demand nears capacity supply limits, to attempt to create such incentives
and to ensure reliability.66
As it operates an “energy-only” market, ERCOT uses scarcity
pricing – a price adder that applies when electricity demand approaches
the total available supply.67 Price increases generally result from increased
demand coupled with less efficient production or as a result of the

Raúl Bajo-Buenestado, Operating Reserve Demand Curve, Scarcity Pricing and Intermittent
Generation: Lessons from the Texas ERCOT Experience, 149 ENERGY POL'Y. 1 (2021).
59 Cramton, supra note 9, at 1.
60 Quick Facts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Nov. 27, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/TX..
61 Bill Gates, It is Surprisingly Hard to Store Energy, GATESNOTES (Feb. 22, 2016)
https://www.gatesnotes.com/energy/it-is-surprisingly-hard-to-store-energy.
62 Zelinski, supra note 8, at 6.
63 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58, at 2.
64 Id.
65 Id at 10.
66 Id at 3.
67 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58, at 2.
58
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Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC).68 The ORDC is designed to
“ensure electricity prices accurately reflect shortage conditions” 69 and
“automatically increases the price of power as reserves get tighter.”70 In
theory, generators should be paid a location-based spot price reflecting
real-time market conditions and an additional amount, “the ORDC price
adder.”71 With this financial incentive, generators should then increase
investments in generation units, ultimately restoring adequate market
supply.72 The incentive provided by the price adder supplement should
ensure that all power generators are operating at full capacity if necessary
in times of significantly elevated demand.73 Consequently, in extreme
conditions, Texas’ power system does not rely on market mechanisms
alone in attempting to ensure adequate power supply.
However, ERCOT’s pricing system failed during winter storm Uri.
When ERCOT ordered load shedding to preserve the grid, its pricing
algorithms read these power reductions as the grid having excess power
capacity. ERCOT’s pricing algorithms failed to accurately understand the
existing imbalances between the system’s demand and supply and to
implement prices reflecting these conditions rather than prices
corresponding to excess capacity.74 In response to this calibration failure,
PUCT mandated that the grid’s then highest allowable price (price cap) of
$9000/MWh remain in place for more than three days.75 Consequently,
some Texas power providers spent more in a few short days to purchase
power than they had spent in several previous years.76 Not surprisingly,
this resulted in shockingly high electricity bills for many that also triggered
several corporate bankruptcies.77

NRG Editorial Voices, What Texas Businesses Need to Know about Scarcity Pricing this
Summer,
NRG
ENERGY
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
2021),
https://www.nrg.com/insights/energy-education/what-texas-businesses-need-toknow-about-scarcity-pricing-this-s.html.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58, at 2.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts, supra note 38, at
60–64.
75Deanna R. Reitman & Jeffrey Bourdon, Winter Storm Uri: New Texas legislation aims to
improve power grid, restructure the grid’s overseeing agency, DLA PIPER, (June 15, 2021),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2021/06/winter-storm-urinew-texas-legislation-aims-to-improve-power-grid/.
76 The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts, supra note 38, at
63.
77 Reitman & Bourdon, supra note 75.
68
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However, ERCOT’s ability to meet peak power demands via the
ORDC came under scrutiny even before February 2021.78 Distorted price
signals can be a challenge for market-oriented approaches, which rely
upon scarcity pricing to ensure optimal reliability.79 For example, in Texas’
case, researchers have demonstrated that the significant levels of windgenerated power, which comprised about 20% of energy sources for
ERCOT in 2019, can have an adverse impact upon the accuracy of the
ORDC pricing mechanism.80 In contrast to other sources of power, wind
is uncontrollable or “non-dispatchable,” meaning that it does not (and
cannot) respond to market conditions.81 Wind energy failures occurred in
the storm as some windmills froze, but except for “two brief instances,”82
the resulting wind energy losses did not exceed those that ERCOT had
anticipated as potentially possible in extreme weather conditions.83
Natural gas supply chain failures proved more consequential.
February 2021 saw the “largest U.S. monthly decline of natural gas
production on record.”84
The Railroad Commission of Texas
(Commission) regulates oil and gas production and transport in Texas.85
It is arguably the most important oil and gas regulator in the world. 86 As
noted, the reliability of Texas’ power grid is dependent upon natural gas
power plants, some of which rely upon electricity to operate.87 ERCOT
had expected thermal resource losses of approximately 14GWs, but actual
losses were closer to 30GWs.88
78 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58. Extreme cold weather in February 2011 also caused
power outages and reductions. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission & North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, Report on Outages and Curtailments During the
Southwest Cold Weather Event of February 1–5, 2011 (Aug. 2011),
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/08-16-11-report.pdf.
79 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58. Extreme cold weather in February 2011 also caused
power outages and reductions. See Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n & North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, Report on Outages and Curtailments During the Southwest Cold Weather
Event of February 1-5, 2011 (Aug. 2011), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/202004/08-16-11-report.pdf.
80 Bajo-Buenestado, supra note 58, at 2–3.
81 Id.
82 Cramton, supra note 9.
83 Id.
84 FERC et. al, supra note 2, at 5.
85
About Us, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (last visited Mar. 2, 2022)
https://www.rrc.texas.gov/about-us.
86 James W. Coleman, Rebuilding the Texas Railroad Commission, 20 OIL GAS & ENERGY L.
1, 1, 4–5 (2022).
87 Nate Chute, What Percentage of Texas Energy is Renewable? Breaking Down the State’s Power
Sources from Gas to Wind., AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Feb. 17,2021, Updated Feb.
19 2021), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/17/texas-energy-windpower-outage-natural-gas-renewable-green-new-deal/6780546002/.
88 Cramton, supra note 9 at 1.
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THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE TRANSITION TO CLEANER
ENERGY

As energy markets increasingly turn to renewable resources,
adequate supplies of natural gas are tremendously important.89 It is the
critical resource for ensuring power reliability as energy markets transition
because of its dispatchability in shortages.90 The challenge, however, of
natural gas is that, like electricity, and unlike more traditional sources of
energy such as coal and uranium, it is exceedingly difficult and expensive
to store.91 Thus, the natural gas system depends on an extensive supply
chain to provide just-in-time delivery of whatever volume of natural gas is
necessary to meet current demand for heat and electricity.92 And turning
to electric heating, rather than natural gas heating, counterintuitively
increases natural gas consumption because burning natural gas for
electricity to turn back into heat is far less efficient than simply burning
the gas directly for heat.93 Texas produces more gas than any other U.S.
state and the United States produces far more natural gas than any other
country, so gas is generally in ample supply.94 Winter storm Uri, however,
revealed that the interconnected natural gas and electricity supply chains
can be fragile because of their constant dependence on balancing supply
and demand in both markets.95
This challenge will grow more and more acute as the country
attempts to clean up its energy system by: 1) relying on electricity to meet
For example, reduced supplies of natural gas have recently proved problematic and
contributed to energy price increases. Joe Wallace, Energy Prices in Europe Hit Records After
Wind Stops Blowing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/energyprices-in-europe-hit-records-after-wind-stops-blowing-11631528258; See, e.g., Nichola
Groom & Andrea Ricci, California asks Biden administration to allow gas plants to run at
maximum,
REUTERS
(Sept.
9,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/california-asks-biden-administration-allowgas-plants-run-maximum-2021-09-09.
90 See generally James W. Coleman, Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process and
the Cost of Capital, ENERGY L. AND ECON. (2018).
91 Id.
92 See generally Id.
93 Neil Leslie, Full-Fuel-Cycle Energy and Emission Factors for Building Energy Consumption –
2018 Update, AMERICAN GAS ASS’N, Jan. 2019, at 38 tbl. 5 (showing that electric heating
only provides 1/2.53 of the heat energy in the natural gas burned),
https://www.aga.org/globalassets/research--insights/reports/22433-ffc-final-report2019-01-14.pdf.
94 Bill Brown, United States Continued to Lead Global Petroleum and Natural Gas Production in
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(July
19,
2021),
2020,
U.S.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48756#; Chute, supra note 87.
95 Wallace, supra note 89.
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more and more of human needs for transportation and heating, and 2)
relying on natural gas to replace dirtier sources of electricity and back up
renewable sources of energy that do not require fuel combustion, but
cannot be dispatched to the grid on command.96 And the final step in
decarbonization will be ensuring that natural gas powered back-up is used
as little as possible.97 Thus, natural gas infrastructure will be used less and
less but become more and more important as the last-resort source of
dispatchable electricity to meet all the human needs that are growing
increasingly dependent on the power grid.98 As human health and safety
increasingly depends on the availability of inconsistently used gas
infrastructure, the private gas industry will increasingly be subject to utilitytype reliability regulations.99 Regulated rate utilities may find it easier to
accept the need to build and maintain rarely-used gas infrastructure so long
as they can pass the rates on to utility consumers,100 but in competitive
market states such as Texas, it may prove difficult to find companies that
want to invest in costly infrastructure that will only rarely be used.101
6.

THE PATH FORWARD

A multitude of problems contributed to the disastrous human and
economic costs of winter storm Uri. To prevent a repeat of this episode,
regulation that gets the economic incentives of the grid’s ecosystem right
is necessary.102 Fixing Texas’ power grid ultimately requires a multifaceted
approach, including the implementation of relatively straightforward
reforms and of solutions to more complex questions. The former category
includes simple changes such as ensuring that critical infrastructure
appropriately registers as such with ERCOT and does not enroll in
incentive programs such as the Demand Response Program. It also
encompasses better seasonal forecasting by ERCOT and a faster action
when load shedding is necessary, both changes should aid in preventing
the grid’s frequency failure; the clear identification of critical grid
infrastructure; the refinement of ERCOT’s scarcity pricing algorithms;
and, improved communication between ERCOT and the Commission
and among these regulators, power grid participants, and the public.
Coleman, supra note 90.
Id.
98 Id.
99 See generally James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Using Proposed
Rules to Transform Industry Long Before Final Rules Are Tested in Court, 24 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 497 (2017).
100 Id. at 499–500.
101 See generally Coleman, supra note 90.
102 Id.
96
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The more complex issues include: 1) whether Texas should
connect to one or both of the wider, national electric grids, 2)
implementing effective penalties for failure to weatherize the power supply
chain properly, and 3) effectively financing the firm resources necessary to
ensure grid reliability, that is, a transition to a capacity market model with
guaranteed payments or retaining an energy-only approach, but with more
frequent and increased price spikes?
In June 2021 Texas’ legislature passed a number of reforms to
improve reliability of its power grid.103 These reforms center on: requiring
the weatherization of power generators and fines for non-compliance;
restructuring of ERCOT’s governance structure; and, increasing
consumer awareness of energy shortages, including an emergency pricing
program and alerts.104 However, the new law does not define
“weatherization,” leaving ERCOT or the Commission to define this term.
Consequently, “weatherization” could include a host of changes, ranging
from the mostly costless (the identification of critical infrastructure) to
somewhat costly (insulating key power plant sensors and cooling water
that should not freeze) to the extremely costly (defrosting capabilities at
all gas wells).
7.

CONCLUSION

Texas’ February 2021 power crisis holds several lessons for
business lawyers. First, this episode, and its aftermath, highlights the
importance of taking a holistic perspective of a client’s business risks,
including its energy dependencies, and incorporating this point of view
into the provision of legal services. Second, it reinforces the need for
effective, timely communication for business lawyers with all stakeholders.
Third, it demonstrates how important it is to identify the critical
components (infrastructure) of a clients’ business model and take steps to
safeguard its integrity. Finally, it illustrates the need for accurate
forecasting and pricing mechanisms; the potential issues supply chain
vulnerabilities and disruptions can cause; the role of and behaviors
encouraged by incentive structures; and, the critical task of planning for
extreme, but not unprecedented, conditions.

See generally Reitman & Bourdon, supra note 75.
The changes to ERCOT’s governance structure include: a decrease in the overall
number of directors and those eligible to vote; qualification requirements for most
directors; an independence requirement; a Texas residency requirement; and, a political
appointment process for the ERCOT board selection committee. Id.
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